We compare the performance of two popular iterative algorithms, fictitious play and counterfactual regret minimization, in approximating Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. Despite recent success of counterfactual regret minimization in multiplayer poker and conjectures of its superiority, we show that fictitious play leads to improved Nash equilibrium approximation with statistical significance over a variety of game sizes.
Introduction
In two-player zero-sum games a Nash equilibrium strategy is guaranteed to win (or tie) in expectation against any opposing strategy by the minimax theorem. In games with more than two players there can be multiple equilibria with different values to the players, and following one has no performance guarantee; however, it was shown that a Nash equilibrium strategy defeated a variety of agents submitted for a class project in a 3-player imperfect-information game, Kuhn poker [13] . This demonstrates that Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in practice despite the fact that they do not have a performance guarantee.
While Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for two-player zero-sum games, it is PPAD-hard to compute for non-zero-sum and games with 3 or more agents and widely believed that no efficient algorithms exist [8, 9] . Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an iterative self-play procedure that has been proven to converge to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum [28] . It has been utilized by superhuman agents in two-player poker, first for limit [2] and then for no-limit [23, 5] . It can also be run in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games, but has no significant theoretical guarantees for these settings. It was demonstrated that it does in fact converge to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (a strategy profile in which no player can gain more than ǫ by deviating) in three-player Kuhn poker, while it does not converge to equilibrium in the larger game of three-player Leduc hold 'em [1] . It was subsequently proven that CFR guarantees that no weight is put on iteratively strictly-dominated strategies or actions [17] . While for some small games this guarantee can be very useful (e.g., for two-player Kuhn poker a high fraction of the actions are iteratively-dominated), in most realistic games (such as Texas hold 'em) only a very small fraction of actions are iteratively-dominated, and the guarantee is not useful [11] . Despite a lack of a significant theoretical guarantee, CFR was combined with subgame solving [16] and depth-limited search [7, 21] to produce a superhuman agent Pluribus for multiplayer poker [6] .
Fictitious play (FP) is another iterative algorithm that has been demonstrated to converge to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games (and in certain other game classes), though not in general for multiplayer or non-zero-sum games [3, 27] . While it is not guaranteed to converge in multiplayer games, it has been proven that if it does converge, then the average of the strategies played throughout the iterations constitute an equilibrium [10] . Fictitious play has been successfully applied to approximate Nash equilibrium strategies in a 3-player poker tournament to a small degree of approximation error [14, 15] . More recently fictitious play has also been used to approximate equilibrium strategies in multiplayer auction [25, 26] and national security [12] scenarios.
Both counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play can be integrated with Monte Carlo sampling to enable scalability in large imperfect-information games [22, 19] . Recently both approaches have also been integrated with deep reinforcement learning to obtain strong performance in forms of poker [20, 4] . These two approaches were compared in a simplified version of two-player poker called flop hold 'em poker as well as 2-player limit Texas hold 'em, and Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization [4] was shown to outperform Neural Fictitious Self Play [20] . It was concluded from these results that "Fictitious Play has weaker theoretical convergence guarantees than CFR, and in practice converges slower." [4] However, this claim is just made based off the performance of specific integrations of CFR and FP with deep reinforcement learning on two-player zero-sum poker variants. The conclusion does not necessarily generalize to other versions of the algorithms, to other games, or to performance in multiplayer games (where neither approach guarantees convergence).
In this paper we compare the performance of the core versions of the counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play algorithms for a variety of numbers of players and strategies.
Fictitious Play and Counterfactual Regret Minimization
A strategic-form game consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a finite set of pure strategies S i for each player i, and a real-valued utility for each player for each strategy vector (aka strategy profile),
For simplicity we will assume that all players have the same number of pure strategies, |S i | = m for all i. A two-player game is called zero sum if the sum of the payoffs for all strategy profiles equals zero, i.e., u 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) + u 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) = 0 for all s 1 ∈ S 1 , s 2 ∈ S 2 . If this sum is always equal to some constant c as opposed to zero then the game is called constant sum. Games that are constant sum are strategically equivalent to zero-sum games, and all results from zero-sum games (e.g., minimax theorem and convergence of CFR and FP) also hold for constant-sum games.
A mixed strategy σ i for player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies, where σ i (s i ′ ) is the probability that player i plays pure strategy s i ′ ∈ S i under σ i . Let Σ i denote the full set of mixed strategies for player i. A strategy profile σ * = (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * n ) is a Nash equilibrium if u i (σ * i , σ * −i ) ≥ u i (σ i , σ * −i ) for all σ i ∈ Σ i for all i ∈ N , where σ * −i denotes the vector of the components of strategy σ * for all players excluding player i. It is well known that a Nash equilibrium exists in all finite games [24] . In practice all that we can hope for is convergence of iterative algorithms to an approximation of Nash equilibrium. For a given candidate strategy profile σ * , define ǫ(σ * ) = max i max σ
The goal is to compute a strategy profile σ * with as small a value of ǫ as possible (i.e., ǫ = 0 would indicate that σ * comprises an exact Nash equilibrium). We say that a strategy profile σ * with value ǫ constitutes an ǫequilibrium. For two-player zero-sum games, there are bounds on the value of ǫ as a function of the number of iterations and game size, and for different variations ǫ is proven to approach zero in the limit at different worst-case rates (e.g., [18] ).
In fictitious play, each player plays a best response to the average strategies of his opponents thus far. Strategies are initialized arbitrarily at t = 1 (for our experiments we will initialize them to be uniformly random). Then each player uses the following rule to obtain the average strategy at time t:
where σ ′t i is a best response of player i to the profile σ t−1 −i of the other players played at time t − 1. Thus, the final strategy after T iterations σ T is the average of the strategies played in the individual iterations (while the best response σ ′t i is the strategy actually played at iteration t). For the core version of counterfactual regret minimization, we first compute the regret for not playing each pure strategy s i as opposed to following strategy σ t . This is defined as
The regret for s i at iteration T is then defined as R T (s i ) = T t=1 r t (s i ). Define R T + (s i ) = max{R T (s i ), 0}. Initial strategies σ 1 are uniform random, as for fictitious play. Then, in the core version of CFR strategies are selected according to the regret matching rule:
.
If the denominator s ′ i ∈S i R T + (s ′ i ) equals zero then we assign each pure strategy with equal probability. As for fictitious play, it is the average of the strategies played over the T iterations that is ultimately output (not the final round strategy).
Experiments
We ran experiments with the core versions of fictitious play and counterfactual regret minimization on uniform-random games for a variety of number of players n and number of pure strategies m. We consider n = 2, 3, 4, 5 and m = 3, 5, 10. For each setting of n and m we randomly generated 10,000 games with all payoffs chosen uniformly random in [0,1]. For each game, we ran both algorithms for 10,000 iterations (except for the largest game n = 5, m = 10 we used 1,000 iterations). For n = 2 we also experimented on zero-sum games where player 1's payoff is selected uniformly in [0,1] and player 2's payoff equals 1 minus player 1's payoff. For each game, we computed the degree of Nash equilibrium approximation ǫ by the two algorithms, as well as the difference between the values of ǫ. We compute the 95% confidence interval for the ǫ differences. If statistical significance was not obtained after 10,000 games for given values of n and m, then we ran 100,000 games. If statistical significance was still not obtained after 100,000 games, then we declared a tie. The results from the experiments appear in Table 1 .
The results indicate that CFR outperformed FP in two out of the three two-player zero-sum cases (m = 5, 10), which agrees with the previously described results in two-player zero-sum games and the claim that CFR has a stronger theoretical convergence guarantee [4] . However, for all other cases (3-5 player and 2player general-sum) fictitious play outperformed counterfactual regret minimization (with all but two of the results statistically significant at the 95% confidence level). FP seemed to outperform CFR by more as the number of players increased, with largest improvement for the 5-player settings. This indicates that fictitious play would be particularly superior to CFR for settings with larger numbers of agents. Table 1 : Results for uniform-random games. First column is number of players n (and whether zero-sum for n = 2); second column is number of pure strategies per player m; third column is the number of games generated; fourth column is the number of iterations for CFR and FP; fifth column is average value of ǫ from CFR; sixth column is average value of ǫ from FP; seventh column is average value of the difference between CFR ǫ and FP ǫ, with the 95% confidence interval (positive value indicates that FP outperformed CFR, and negative value that CFR outperformed FP).
